Disclaimer: I hate disclaimers...they're lame. However, I just wanted to say that I am posting what follows because I'm interested in the subject and would welcome comments/criticisms/observations. It is in no way a comprehensive study of self-sacrifice, or for that matter Derek Parfit's ideas. I wanted to put the draft up for people (ok mainly Ted) who are wondering what I've been thinking about in the last week. All references are from: Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons And Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Q: Is it possible to act in a way that is genuinely self-sacrificing?
It seems undeniable that it is possible to act in a way that is genuinely self-sacrificing. It is possible that, in the event that a child fell in front of an on-coming train, a stranger on the platform could decide to save the child in the knowledge that this action would cost him his own life. Assuming that the stranger does not have a death wish or some similar desire, it would be contrary to self-interest for him to engage in the rescue, thus rendering his act of self-sacrifice genuine. So an act of genuine self-sacrifice is possible. But though we may be able to intuitively dispense with the possibility problem rather easily, this is no doubt beside the point. Just because we can conceive of a stranger throwing himself before a train for altruistic ends does not guarantee that we will not think him an admirable lunatic.
In order to propose a more specific analysis of the problem of self-sacrifice, I will rephrase the original question in the following way:
Q2: Could a rational person choose to act in a way that genuinely opposes self-interest?
To address this slightly narrower question, I will summarize a few of the arguments set out by Derek Parfit as objections to The Self-Interest Theory. Though Parfit is concerned with wider matters than our current question, his first argument against The Self-Interest Theory makes a convincing case for the possibility of self-sacrifice as rational choice. As self-interest could be seen as the most obvious opponent to self-sacrifice, the decision to use Parfit’s description and critique of the theory as our starting point is justified.
In Reasons and Persons, Parfit introduces The Self-Interest Theory as an argument for the rationality of pursuing one’s advantage (Parfit 1984, p. 3). The theory is defined and re-defined at different stages of Parfit’s complicated argument, but these two versions will serve our purpose well:
(S2) What each of us has most reason to do is whatever would be best for himself, and
(S3) It is irrational for anyone to do what he believes will be worse for himself (p. 126).
As stated, The Self-Interest Theory is categorically opposed to the idea of rational self-sacrifice. According to S2 and S3, though the stranger on the platform may feel sympathy for the fallen child, he is rationally justified in the choice to stay where he is as inaction would best preserve his interests. The choice to sacrifice one’s interests clearly opens one up to rational criticism from a position that holds the preservation of these interests to be one’s ultimate aim. A proponent of the Self-Interest Theory could respond to Q2 that it is impossible for a rational person to act in a way that is genuinely self-sacrificing, as genuine self-sacrifice involves choosing what would be worse for oneself and, according to S3, this would be an irrational choice. So how are we to challenge the Self-Interest theorist?
With the aim of objecting to The Self-Interest Theory, Parfit claims to weaken its position by introducing another rational theory that focuses not on our self-interest or well-being but our desires (p. 116). As we move from The Self-Interest Theory to this new idea, the justification for action moves from what would be best for ourselves to what would best fulfill our desires. This argument, called The Present Aim Theory (P), is presented by Parfit in three forms. The second version, called The Deliberative Theory (DP) is as follows:
DP: What each of us has most reason to do is what would best achieve, not what he actually wants, but what he would want, at the time of acting, if he had undergone a process of ‘ideal deliberation’-if he knew the relevant facts, was thinking clearly, and was free from distorting influences (p. 118).
The Deliberative theory attempts to avoid the problem of confused or conflicting desires by proposing that the desires that should motivate our actions are those that we would select in an ideal deliberative setting. Clearly it would be impossible for a person, in every case where decision-making is required, to find an ideal deliberation zone and weigh desires until the correct course of action revealed itself. In our train-station example, the stranger is required to make a split-second judgment, he is not afforded the luxury of deliberation. Therefore a choice to violate his self-interest and save the child would not be rationally justified, as even if that would be his dominant desire, he would have no way of justifying this without deliberation. In addition, it seems unlikely that in the deliberation described above, the stranger would choose the self-sacrificing action, or at least this is what the Self-Interest theorist would argue.
Self-Interest theory, when entering moral debates, claims that all of us ultimately fall back on the desire that our lives go as well as possible. This tendency could be called a “bias in one’s own favour” (p. 131). The Self-Interest theorist would say that it is irrational to care as much about anything or anyone as much as we care about our interests and selves. But it is precisely when Self-Interest theory interacts with morality that, Parfit argues, it is most vulnerable (p. 126). Though theories of Present-Aims cannot do too much damage to Self-Interest Theory alone, when Self-Interest theory finds itself hemmed in by Morality on the one hand, and Present-aims Theory on the other, it begins to look a bit weaker (p. 127). Parfit’s first major argument against Self-Interest Theory rejects the notion that self-bias is the supreme rational desire, and uses morally admirable action as an example of an equally rational consideration. He starts by introducing a revision of Present-aim theory:
There is at least one desire that is not irrational, and is no less rational than the bias in one’s own favour. This is a desire to do what is in the interests of other people, when this is either morally admirable, or one’s moral duty (p.131).
By this line of thought, the desire to act in a way that sacrifices one’s interests is no less rational than the choice to act in accordance with a bias in one’s own favour if the act of self-sacrifice is morally admirable, or one’s moral duty. By formulating a theory that blends elements of Present-aim theory and Morality, Parfit has challenged Self-interest Theory. But how does his revised theory apply to our example above?
In the case of the stranger on the train platform, it is not his moral duty to sacrifice his life to save the child. If he does not act, he will probably be haunted by his memory of the horrible accident for some time, but he will have no reason to feel guilt for the rest of his life because he chose not to make the ultimate choice of self-sacrifice. If it was the stranger’s moral duty to save the child, it might not even be a genuine case of self-sacrifice but an act of obedience to some sort of moral imperative, perhaps a rational act, but not an act of rational self-sacrifice. However, if the stranger chose to save the child, knowing that he is not morally required to, knowing that his action will be the worst for his own self-interest, but acting because he cares more about the survival of the child’s interests than his own, this action could be seen as morally admirable and thus no less rational than the bias in one’s own favour. A rational person might choose an act of genuine self-sacrifice if this act would best fulfill the person’s present desire: to act in a morally admirable way. So if we allow the possibility that morally admirable action is not irrational, we must allow the possibility that a rational person could choose to act in a way that is genuinely self-sacrificing.
4 comments:
Evan,
I am honored to have been specifically mentioned as a reason for this post, but more honored to note the subject matter you chose to address in this paper. I think you are right to suggest that a "good" action that is not in one's own self interest, would be motivated by the desire to place someone else's interest above or at least equal to your own. (morality).
Of course, I naturally think of this question from a Christian perspective, but I suppose one could also analyze it from the view of the herd vs the individual. Someone my age might save the child because it is best to save an individual who is coming into reproductive capacity when one is past reproductive age. (You could argue that acting so that humans live on after one's own death even if it shortens one's own life is really self-interest.)
In my view, the situation you used to illustrate your paper... saving a child's life but losing your own...occurs much less frequently in life than situations where the choice is between an action that benefits only self (win-lose) and one that benefits both self and other (win-win). The challenge comes in deliberating to identify the action that will produce a win-win result.
I enjoyed reading this piece. But it seems more hypothetical then practical. Rational people don’t exist, so figuring out what they might do in certain situations may have limited value. I’m not doubting the value of logic or the possibility of rational thought, but we are all subject to varying levels of fear, bravado, anger, bliss, early morning slows, or post work zombies—to name just a few. All of our choices are an amalgamation of these influences—often rationalized though logic, plus some moral/ethical principles, and, (hopefully) some genuine rationality. The real issue (which must be addressed before the issue of “self interest”) is what makes up “self”? What if self includes altruism? What if self includes a bit of insanity?
My own disclaimers:
(1) This is a very long comment, and I haven’t taken much time to define some crucial terms--like "original exigency" and "point of convergence"
(2)I honestly had no intention to philosophize for so long, and I don't expect anyone to read this anyway.
(3)Thanks Evan for providing a stimulating question. I'm convinced that I've addressed your Question. However, I doubt I've answered it.
(4) Finally, this is not an exhaustive dissertation. I expect readers to fill in the gaps in several places. If my logic looks odd, let me know and will do some filling in.
It seems there are some important questions to answer.
1)Why do we genuinely care about rational thought?
2)What's so very bad about insanity?
3)Does meaningful exigency exist for human action?
I realize these may not seem specifically relevant to your Q., but your discussion really begins by asking whether the stranger is an admirable lunatic. In other words, is possible to be consistently admirable and rational under all circumstances? Given a moral context, I assume you mean that we judge a man admirable because of his goodness. Therefore, we are really asking whether it is possible to be consistently good and rational under all circumstances.
If this interpretation of your Q is correct, then my opening questions have relevance for the following reason.
(1)A rational action must be based on a set of givens,(or axioms, presuppositions).
(2)The nature of these presuppositions is not obtained by rational thought unless they are considered self evident.
(3)Defining these presuppositions is really the heart of any given argument. Everything else will be fancy wordplay.
(4) My three questions are essentially different ways to explore the same question: what are the rational presuppositions for rational action?
Obviously, my direction of thought is slanted towards the concept of original exigency, i.e self-evident and universally binding moral principles issuing from an unchallenged, infinite authority. You may either accept the bias or challenge me with the alternative, which in my opinion, is that the universe is essentially meaningless.
On point one:
Either we care about rational thought because we're unlucky cuckoos or we care because of an original, self defining exigency.
On point two:
In your post, I really wouldn't mind too much if a man on the platform had stayed on the platform. But try this scenario: The girl manages to get partly out of the way, but the train still hits her, severing her legs above the knee. Imagine the man on the platform bursting into heinous laughter. He leaps down on top of the girl and proceeds to gouge out her eyeballs. Now, let's suppose it is irrational for this man to save the girl at the cost of his own life. Of course, it is also irrational for him to laughingly gouge out the girl's eyes. But is there any difference between these two actions? I fully realize I am playing with emotion, child-hood conditioning, and religious brainwashing, but even with all that aside, which sort of a man would be more viable in an evolutionary context?*
*that is, let us assume the atheistic, evolutionary position, and believe that human culture is the result of evolutionary processes. Then the probability that out of the infinite number of irrational actions that the man on the platform could have undertaken, only the one in which he himself died could be considered admirable, i.e. evolutionarily advantageous, is vanishingly small. And this is completely ignoring the obvious probability that absolutely no action would be the most evolutionarily rational action in this case.
Therefore, this argument implies that insanity is acting in an irrational way without moral justification (I realize that some insanity is harmless, or morally neutral). It’s unfortunate that this statement implies circular reasoning. I’m really only saying that moral justification makes an irrational action rational during the moment of action.
On point three:
I argue for original exigency based on my concept of thought patterns. I'm still working out my theory on this, but basically, I can conceive of a number of strategies that our brains use as they function.
(1)Fill in the blank
This pattern is a defocused, big-picture approach that works by association with past experience in an apparently illogical way.
(2)Where from/How come?
A graphic comparison between this pattern an the previous one might be that #1 is like a 3D image composed of twisting lines of thought, whereas #2 is like a 2D image of converging lines, all connected to a common point of origin. Scientists and Mathematicians live and breath #2. They subconsciously believe that all those logical lines actually converge at a single point. Just their most famous advancements-- E=mc2--Einstein connects the matter and energy lines and he becomes a science god. Watson and Crick--they connect all the biological inheritance lines and the discovery was heralded as the most important scientific triumph of the age. I'm thinking of other patterns, but these will suffice for my current argument.
Given the strictly rational bent of this context, I will consider only #2.
Observation 1: Science has used the converging line thought pattern to great effect in the past 5oo Years. It has launched men into space, eradicated disease, and harnessed explosive potential large enough to destroy life on this planet.
Observation 2: This converging line thought pattern has been around for a long time. The Greeks used it in Geometry, the Egyptians in pyramid building, etc...
Conclusion 1: Modern Science has been successful because it emphasizes the repeatability of experiments and an unbiased approach to observation.
Conclusion 2: Either we reject our practical experience of reality and dismiss the advances of Science as meaningless and imaginary, or we conclude that Science is actually on the right track. In other words, concrete reality actually does have a single point of convergence--we just haven’t quite gotten there yet.
Since science has discovered increasingly stupendous things about the universe as it works towards the hypothetical point of convergence, it is reasonably probable, that as Science comes closer and closer to the point of convergence, things will grow increasingly stupendous and infinite.
This argument all goes to show that their is a striking correlation between the point of convergence and the concept of original exigency. I believe that God is both the original exigency and the point of convergence. God is a logical necessity if one is to justify good moral action by saying that it is also rational.
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